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REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO A VICTIM OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In several respects discrimination in employment and hiring
practices presents an insurmountable barrier to the Negroes' strug-
gle to achieve equality of treatment. Such discrimination results in
social tension, subordinates a race economically, and stifles hope as
opportunity is foreclosed. Efforts to eliminate racial discrimination
m the employment area have led to the creation and utilization of
various agencies, boards, and commissions on the federal, state, and
local governmental levels. Legislative, executive, and judicial rem-
edies stand ready to redress the aggrieved Negro and deter discrim-
inatory practices. These devices can effectively reduce discrimina-
tion m employment if substantially utilized. To be utilized they
must be understood and trusted by those for whose benefit such
remedies exist. The present study explains and evaluates the alterna-
tives available to an employee or job applicant who feels he is the
victim of racial discrimination.
II. STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRAcTIC S LAWS
A. Background
The Ohio fair employment practices law,' like that of most
states, establishes an administrative commission charged with elim-
mating unequal treatment of minority groups through "informal
methods of conciliation and persuasion ' 2 which removes the ex-
pense, mconvemence, and haphazardness of court action.8 Criminal
sanctions have been found too imprecise to deal with certain com-
plex types of misconduct arising from racial prejudice. Adminis-
trative enforcement is better equipped for specialized handling of
both the determination of guilt and the selection of remedies.4 The
courts have been held in reserve to review the fairness of the ad-
ministrative action and to enforce compliance with administrative
orders.
The administrative method of enforcement of anti-discrimma-
1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.99 (Page 1965).
2 These are the words used in the statute empowering the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission to enforce the fair employment practices law. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §
4112.05 (Page 1965).
8 7 013o CIvuL RIGHTS CoMMIssION ANN. REP. (1966) [hereinafter cited as COMMst.
REP.]
4 W. GEI.wORN & C. BysE, ADMINIsmATIvE LAW 3-6 (1954).
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tion laws evolved in 1941 out of vigorous protests from Negro and
other civil rights organizations against the exclusion of minorities
from employment in the growing war industry. President Roose-
velt responded by issuing an executive order 5 which applied to de-
fense contractors and established a Fair Employment Practices Com-
mittee. Subsequently the scope of coverage was broadened by an-
other executive order8 which applied to all government contracts,
not just those dealing with defense, and which required prime con-
tractors to include non-discrimination clauses in their subcontracts.
These executive orders provided for inclusion in government con-
tracts of clauses barring discriminatory employment practices by the
contractors. The Fair Employment Practices Commission was di-
rected to supervise enforcement of the provisions and was endowed
with many of the procedures typical of administrative agencies;
however, the commission was denied the power to issue enforceable
orders.7
The successes and failures of these federal wartime fair employ-
ment practice commissions has been adequately recounted else-
where;8 it is sufficient for our purposes to note that "the federal
government's success, however modest, with a commission specially
created to combat discrimination"9 inspired efforts to obtain fair
employment legislation in the states. In 1945, shortly before the fed-
eral Fair Employment Practice Commission expired, New York en-
acted the first state law adopting the commission device. By 1967,
thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and at
least fifty-six municipalities had enacted fair employment practice
laws. Of the thirty-eight states with such laws, thirty-one provided
for enforcement through administrative agencies.10
5 Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
6 Exec. Order No. 9,346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1943).
7 Exec. Order No. 8,802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
8 M. SovmN, LEGAL RESIRANT ON RACIL DLsCauMINATION IN E PLoYMynr 9-17
(1966) [hereinafter cited as M. SovERN].
9 id. at 20.
10 The following 12 states have no F.E.P. statutes:
Alabama North Carolina
Arkansas North Dakota
Florida South Carolina
Georgia South Dakota
Louisiana Texas
Mississippi Virginia
The following seven states with F.E.P. laws do not provide for adequate enforcement
procedures (states to which the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commiion
does not defer-discussed in part II of this study):
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On July 29, 1959, the Ohio General Assembly enacted a fair
employment practices law which prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ances-
try. 1 The law covers employers of more than three persons, labor
unions and employment agencies. It applies to discrimination in
initial hiring, promotion, wages and working conditions. The Ohio
Civil Rights Commission, consisting of five members appointed on
a bipartisan basis by the Governor, was created to enforce the law.
Another Ohio statute,12 somewhat analogous to the previously
mentioned federal executive orders, is directed toward a much nar-
rower class than the general fair employment practice act. This
statute, enacted in 1935, requires that contracts for public construc-
tion between the state and private contractors contain provisions by
which the contractor agrees not to discriminate by reason of race,
creed, or color in the hiring of employees for the performance of
work under his state contract. Additionally, the contractor must
agree that he will not discriminate against any employee who is
hired for work on the state construction project.'$
Arizona Oklahoma
Idaho Tennessee
Maine Vermont
Montana
Hearings on S. 1308 Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 69 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1308].
11 OHIO REY. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.99 (Page 1965).
12 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 153.59 (Page 1965).
13 Recent additions to OHIO Rxv. CODE ANN. § 153.59 (Page 1965) will be dis-
cussed at a more appropriate place (part V of this paper). See also discussion of Gov-
ernor Rhodes' Executive Order of June 15, 1966 as subsequently amended, infra,
part V.
Although not germane to a discussion of employment discrimination, there have
been other recent civil rights laws enacted. On October 24, 1901, the Public Accom.
modations Law was enacted which made illegal the discriminatory denial of service
in all places of public accommodation. On October 30, 1965, the Ohio General As.
sembly passed the Fair Housing Law which made discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry illegal in the field of housing, sub-
ject to certain exceptions.
These laws have been supplemented by two Executive Orders by the Governor.
The "Executive Code of Fair Practices", issued on June 25, 1963, prohibits discrlm-
ination in employment practices by the state, service to the public, the purchase of
goods or services, employment services, state apprenticeship and vocational guidance
programs, and licensing and regulatory practices. On June 15, 1966, the Governor
issued an Executive Order seeking to insure compliance with the fair employment
law on state construction projects (a discussion of this Order and its later amend-
ments appears subsequently as noted above).
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B. Procedures and Remedies Under Fair Employment Practice Laws
1. What Conduct Is Prohibited?
Although "Ohio employs the [same] general procedure as that
used by similar agencies in other jurisdictions,"14 the Ohio fair em-
ployment practices law contains provisions which caused it to be
"regarded by supporters of such legislation as the most advanced of
any fair employment law"' 5 at the time it was passed. Ohio provi-
sions differing from the general pattern of such laws are pointed out
in the discussion which follows.
Fair employment laws generally prohibit certain discriminatory
conduct on the part of employers, labor organizations, and employ-
ment agencies. The Ohio law is aimed at conduct by: (1) employ-
ers, which the statute defines as including "the state, or any...
subdivision thereof, any person [defined in Ohio Rev. Code section
4112.01 (a) to include groups of individuals, partnerships, associa-
tions, corporations, and others] employing four or more persons
within the state, and any person acting in the interest of an em-
ployer;"' 6 (2) labor organizations, defined to include "any organi-
zation which exists for the purpose ... of collective bargaining or
of dealing with employers concerning grievances .... conditions of
employment;"'I7 and (3) employment agencies, which "includes any
person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to pro-
cure opportunities to work or to procure, recruit, refer, or place em-
ployees."'i s
Certain conduct specified in the statute is deemed to be unlaw-
ful discriminatory practice and thus prohibited. It is unlawful for
an employer to discriminate' 9 in hiring, "tenure, terms, conditions,
14 7 COMM. REP., supra note S at 1.
15 Robison, The New Fair Employment Law, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 570 (1959).
16 Omo REv. CoDE ANsr,. § 4112.01 (b) (Page 1965).
17 Id. § 4112.01 (d).
18 Id. § 4112.01 (e). As will be pointed out in the subsequent discussion of
what constitutes unlawful discriminatory practice under Ohio's fair employment law,
there are several other persons (as defined by the statute) who are restricted in their
conduct in a more narrow sense by this law. Briefly these include joint labor.man.
agement committees, Id. § 4112.02(d), persons seeking employment, Id. § 4112.02(.0,
persons who discriminate against someone who has participated in a proceeding un-
der the fair employment law, Id. § 4112.02(h), and persons who obstruct others from
complying with the law, Id. § 4112.02 (i).
19 The statutory definition for the word "discriminate" is that it "includes segre-
gate or separate". Omo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (G) (Page 1965).
In order to avoid repetition the discrimination which is prohibited is in each
instance discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry.
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or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly re-
lated to employment." 20 An employment agency may not discrim-
inate in accepting, registering, classifying, or referring any person
for employment 2 and is prohibited from complying with an em-
ployer's request for referrals if the request is discriminatory or in-
dicates that the employer discriminates in violation of the fair em-
ployment law.22 A labor organization may not discriminatorily limit
or classify its membership,23 nor may it "[d]iscriminate against any
person or limit his employment opportunities, or otherwise adverse-
ly affect his status as an employee, or his wages, hours, or employ-
ment conditions" 24 unless based upon some legally recognized basis
for discrimination, such as qualification. From these provisions it is
clear that a union violates the law if it refuses to admit to member-
ship and represent its members without regard to color.
Another provision" makes it unlawful for a union to induce
an employer to discriminate against job applicants. It provides that
it is an unlawful employment practice "to aid, abet, incite, compel,
or coerce the doing of any act declared" by the fair employment
law to be unlawful "or to obstruct or prevent any person from com-
plying with [it]."26 Since it is unlawful for employers to discrim-
inate against those applying for jobs, a union which seeks to coerce
or induce such discrimination would be violating the law.27
In addition to the above conventional prohibitions against dis.
crimination, the Ohio law contains a provision 28 which, when en-
acted, was unique in dealing with discrimination in apprentice train-
ing programs, a problem area under other state fair employment
laws.29 It is an unlawful discriminatory practice "[flor any employer,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee control-
ling apprentice training programs to discriminate against any per-
son... in admission to, or employment in any program established
to provide apprentice training."30 Special mention of labor-manage-
ment committees makes them liable in a situation in which responsi-
bility for discrimination is difficult to establish. Where apprentice-
20 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (a) (Page 1965).
21 Id. § 4112.02(b) (I).
22 Id. § 4112.02 (b) (2).
28 Id. § 4112.02 (c) (1).
24 Id. § 4112.02 (c) (2).
25 Id. § 4112.02 (i).
26 Id. § 4112.02(j).
27 M. SOvERN, supra note 8, at 21.
28 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (d) (Page 1965).
29 Robison, supra note 15, at 575.
30 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (d) (Page 1965).
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ship programs are nominally under joint union-employer control,
responsibility is shunted back and forth between union and em-
ployer.81 Until recently "no other state FEP law except Ohio's
[made] any mention of joint labor-management apprenticeship com-
mittees; and consequently it [was] doubtful whether any other law
actually [covered] discriminatory exclusion from apprentice pro-
grams controlled by such committees."3 2
Two shortcomings of Ohio's law with regard to apprenticeship
and training programs result from the wording of the statute. First,
the limitation of the basis of discrimination to race, color, religion,
national origin, or ancestry permits selection of apprentices on a
lawful basis such as discrimination in favor of relatives of union
members. Recognizing that a man has an interest in helping his
children and other relatives obtain employment and in having them
follow his line of work, we may nevertheless question whether such
interest should be allowed to work to the almost total exclusion of
Negroes from the programs necessary to the obtaining of high pay-
ing jobs. If the fair employment law is designed to provide equal
opportunity to minorities, the only basis for distinction between per-
sons should be their objective qualifications. It is inconsistent to
permit nepotism, which has the direct effect of destroying equal
opportunity, to co-exist with such a law.
New York's amended law deals at length with the discrimina-
tory selection of apprentices.33 In addition to prohibiting discrimina-
tion on racial and religious grounds, New York requires apprentice
training programs to select their trainees on the basis of "their qual-
ifications, as determined by objective criteria which permit re-
view."34 Only time will tell whether the Ohio General Assembly,
like New York's, will respond "to the realization that nepotism is
as large a barrier to equal apprenticeship opportunity as racial dis-
crimination."3 15
The second shortcoming of the Ohio provision discussed above
is that unlike most states which have laws directly or indirectly pro-
hibiting discrimination in admission to or employment in appren-
ticeship, and which apply to training or retraining programs other
than apprenticeship,3" Ohio limits its law to "any program estab-
31 P. NORG.EN & S. HILL, TowARD FAmr EwLwOywm= 48-50 (1964).
32 Id. at 95-96. "The New York law was amended in 1962 to include similar
provisions N.Y. Executive Law Section 296." Id. at 96.
3 N.Y. ExEcur' Lmw § 296 1-a (fcKinney Supp. 1967).
34 Id. at § 296 1-a (a).
35 M. SovEaN, supra note 8, at 21. See generally, id. at 177.
36 BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEPr. OF LABOR, SUMIMARY OF STATE FADL
EMPLOYMENT PRACIICE AcTs (Labor Law Series No. 6-A, June 1966).
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lished to provide apprentice training."37 The purpose of the fair
employment: law would be better served by a prohibition against
discrimination in all training programs, rather than those only con-
cerned with apprentice training.
Ohio law38 proscribes several other specific discriminatory prac-
tices of which an employer8 9 should be particularly aware. Generally
these provisions make it unlawful for an employer to ask applicants
any questions concerning their race, 40 to keep a record of an appli-
cant's race, to use application forms which have questions concern-
ing race, to publish any notice or advertisement relating to employ-
ment which indicates a racial preference, to apply a quota system, or
to utilize in obtaining employees an agency or union known to the
employer to discriminate. The employer or "any person acting in
the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly," 41 must supervise
his hiring program with care since the specific acts set forth in this
part of the statute constitute per se violations. Lack of personal
prejudice or of an intention to discriminate will not suffice as a de-
fense for the employer. In proving a violation of the fair employ-
ment law it is not difficult for an aggrieved Negro employee to show
that the terms or conditions of his employment differ substantially
from those of his white co-workers. On the other hand, the rejected
job applicant has a much tougher task in ascribing his rejection to
unlawful discrimination. But this burden is somewhat relieved by
the statute's listing of specific acts which are deemed unlawful dis-
criminatory practices without the necessity of showing intention to
discriminate. The rejected applicant without any visible proof that
his rejection was based on the fact that he is a Negro may find it
easy to show a violation of the law by submitting the employer's
application form containing prohibited questions. This ease of proof,
along with the likelihood of an employer thinking that so long as
he does not discriminate against any individual he has not violated
the law, makes it particularly important for an employer to be
familiar with and to conduct his hiring practices in accordance with
these provisions. 42
37 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (d) (Page 1965).
38 Id. § 4112.02 (e).
39 T Jhese provisions also apply to employment agencies and labor organizations.
40 These prohibitions apply not only to discrimination by race but also to
color, religion, national origin, and ancestry. For the sake of brevity the term "race"
is used in this article to imply -the others as well.
41 OHio REV. CODE AN. § 4112.01 (b) (Page 1965).
42 "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(E) Except where based on a bona fide occupational qualification certified
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Two other types of conduct are unlawful under Ohio's fair em-
ployment law. The first prohibits anyone in the seeking of employ-
ment from advertising his race or from advertising his preference
as to race of his prospective employer.43 The second prohibits repri-
sals against persons who have opposed unlawful employment prac-
tices, filed complaints with the commission, testified, or otherwise
assisted in proceedings under the provisions of the fair employment
law.44
Before discussing the procedure of the Ohio law it should be
noted that discrimination by an employer is expressly authorized in
two situations. Those employing fewer than four persons are not
considered employers for purposes of the act.45 In addition, any per-
son employed in the domestic service of another is not considered
to be an employee and thus is without the law's reach.40
2. Procedure
The prohibitions of a fair employment law "are only as effec-
tive as the procedural arrangements set up to implement them. 47
The procedure will not be utilized in any but the most extreme
cases unless it is easily available to an aggrieved person and provides
adequate relief. On the other hand, such a law will be most effective
if it receives public acceptance and support, which it will not if the
fairness of its results are doubted.
in advance by the commission for any employer, employment agency, or
labor organization prior to employment or admission to membership to:
(1) Elicit or attempt to elicit any information concerning the race, color,
religion, national origin, or ancestry of an applicant for employment;
(2) Make or keep a record of the race, color, religion, national origin, or
ancestry of any applicant for employment;
(3) Use any form of application.., seeking to elicit information regarding
race;
(4) Print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or ad-
vertisement relating to employment ... indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based upon race...;
(5) Announce or follow a policy of denying, or limiting, through a quota
system or othenvise, employment . . . opportunities of any group because
of the race... of such group;
(6) Utilize in the recruitment or hiring of persons any employment agency,
placement service, training school or center, labor organization . . . known
to discriminate against persons because of their race .... " Oio REv. COnE
ANN. 4112.02(e) (Page 1965).
43 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (f) (Page 1965).
44 Id. § 4112.02 (h).
45 Id. § 4112.01 (b).
46 Id. § 4112.01 (c).
47 M. SovmN, supra note 8, at 22.
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(a) Complaint48
Charges may be filed with the Civil Rights Commission in writ-
ing and under oath 49 by any person. 50 By providing for the filing of
a complaint by any person the statute omits the common require-
ment that actions can only be commenced by the aggrieved indi-
vidual. Since "person" is defined to to include organizations and as-
sociations 1 it is possible for interested civic groups to initiate en-
forcement proceedings in those situations in which the nature of
the discrimination tends to inhibit the filing of complaints. Fur-
thermore, about half the states with fair employment laws,5 8 includ-
ing Ohio, have empowered their administrative agencies to initiate
investigations on their own motion without a complainant. Relief
is denied uniess a charge is filed within six months after the alleged
unlawful practice has been committed.54 This eases the problem
of staleness and the degree of difficulty in finding evidence.
(b) Investigation
"Upon the acceptance or initiation of a charge the respondent
is notified of the violation with which he is charged and an initial
conference set." 55 A field representative investigates the claim and
reports his findings, with recommendations, to the Commission. The
Commission preliminarily determines what action to take on the
basis of these reports and the results of the initial conference.
(c) Determination of "Probable Cause"
The Commission may refuse to issue a complaint on the ground
that probable cause to credit the allegations of the charge has not
been discovered by the investigation. Therefore, "it is not prob-
able that unlawful discriminatory practices have been or are being
engaged in,"50 and the complainant will be so notified. In the period
48 The procedure has been broken down into the same categories as was done
in id. at 23-26.
49 In the period July 1, 1964, to June 30, 1966, an average of approximately 17%
of employment cases were not accompanied by affidavits and did not set forth sufficient
information to warrant initiations by the Commission (no affidavit needed), 7 0o
CIvIL RiGHms Coiam. ANN. REP. (1966).
50 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (b) (Page 1965).
51 Id. § 4112.01 (a).
52 Robison, supra note 15, at 577.
53 BuREAu OF LABOR STANDARDs, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF STATE FAIR
EMPLOYMENT Acrs (Labor Law Series No. 6-A, June 1966).
54 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (b) (Page 1965).
55 7 Comm. REP., supra note 3, at 11.
56 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (b) (Page 1965).
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July 1, 1965, through June 80, 1966, forty-eight percent of employ-
ment charges were dismissed.57
If probable cause is found lacking, the complainant may seek
judicial review in an effort to reverse the Commission's determina-
tion.55 Such action, however, seems precarious in light of the fol-
lowing:
The costs of retaining counsel and prosecuting a court action
are prohibitive for the ordinary rebuffed complainant. More-
over, the courts normally give considerable weight to adminis-
trative determinations, presuming them to be correct unless
clearly persuaded to the contrary, and the dismissal of a com-
plaint is no exception to this general rule. The result is that
complainants hardly ever seek judicial reversal of a complaint
dismissal. Indeed ... the courts are rarely called upon by any-
one at any time in the administration of state fair employment
practices laws.59
While such remarks point out inherent weaknesses, it must be re-
membered that the legislature decided a specialized administrative
agency, not a court, would be better equipped to make the deter-
minations and mould the relief in the area of employment discrim-
ination. On the other hand, without judicial review the Commis-
sion could decide on the basis of the informal investigation that
there was no probable cause to believe an unlawful discriminatory
57 7 Com.w REP., supra note 3, at 19.
58 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.06 (a) (Page 1965). The procedures for such
review are basically as follows: The proceeding must be brought in common pleas
court in the county wherein the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice occurred.
The action is initiated by filing a petition and serving a copy thereof upon the Com-
mission and all parties who appeared before it. The court, after reviewing the case,
may issue an order enforcing, modifying, or setting aside the Commission's determina-
tion.
It should be pointed out that this section also applies to the situation in which
probable cause is found and the Commission proceeds to a hearing. Judicial review
of the post-hearing determination is available to either party claiming to be aggrieved
thereby. This is mentioned at this time because some of the following provisions in
the section providing for judicial review might only be applicable to a Commission
determination subsequent to a hearing.
Upon receiving service of the petition, the Commission must file a transcript of
the record of the hearing before it, which shall include all evidence offered. Except
in extraordinary circumstances, an objection not urged before the Commission can-
not be considered by the court. The court may allow the admission of additional
evidence that could not reasonably have been produced before the Commission. Find-
ings of fact by the Commission are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on
the record and such additional evidence as is admitted. Jurisdiction of the court is
exclusive and its judgment final subject to appellate review. Id.
59 M. SovEtu, supra note 8, at 24. Original footnote omitted.
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practice had occurred ahd therefore reject the complainant's charge
without ever having a formal hearing. The Commission's decision
would be final even though founded on their own interpretation
of the law. Thus the Ohio judicial review procedure permits at least
to a limited degree "review of complaint dismissals to correct legal
errors and also to prevent arbitrary action." 0°
(d) Conciliation
If the Commission determines there is probable cause to be-
lieve unlawful discriminatory practices have occurred, it will seek
"to eliminate such practices by informal methods of conference, con-
ciliation, and persuasion."'61 In fact, the statute allows the Commis-
sion no choice by specifically requiring it to attempt to induce com-
pliance by informal methods before a formal hearing may be insti-
tuted.62 Only in a case where an amicable settlement cannot be ar-
ranged may the Commission conduct a formal administrative hear-
ing. Uniformly, state fair employment practice commissions have re-
lied heavily on informal conciliation proceedings to effectuate volun-
tary compliance, and formal action has been utilized only as a last
resort.6 Illustrative of this strong reliance on informal methods in
Ohio is the fact that during the period July 1, 1963, to June 30, 1966,
the Civil Rights Commission obtained compliance in 332 employ-
ment cases and failed to reach an agreement in only one case.0" In
the one public hearing in the area of employment the Commission
determined that no unlawful discrimination practice existed and an
order was issued dismissing the complaint.0 5
These conciliation negotiations are required by law0" to be kept
confidential, "presumably as an added inducement to the respondent
to revise his practices voluntarily, 01 7 while the threat of publicity at-
tendant to a formal hearing is held in reserve. Almost every case
in which state fair employment commissions find probable cause
ends in a conciliation agreement with the employer promising to
eliminate any unlawful discriminatory practices.0 5
60 Robison, supra note 15, at 578.
61 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (b) (Page 1965).
62 Id. § 4112.05 (a).
63 A. Ross & H. HILL, EMPLOYMENT, RACE, AND POVERTY 512 (1967).
64 5-7 OHIO CIVIL RIGuTS Comm. ANN. REPS. (1964-1966).
65 7 Co:MM. REP., supra note 3.
66 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (b) (Page 1965).
67 P. NORGEN & S. HILL, supra note 31, at 105.
0S M. SovE R, supra note 8, at 25.
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(e) Public Hearing
If informal methods prove unsuccessful, the Commission will
issue a formal complaint stating the charges against the respondent
and containing a notice of public hearing.69 At this hearing,
"[t]hough the Commission is empowered to sit (one or more mem-
bers) as hearing examiners, they have elected to employ persons
outside of the Commission to function in this essential capacity. The
examiners are usually practicing attorneys or law school profes-
sors."70 The Attorney General, representing the Commission, pre-
sents evidence supporting the complaint.71 The respondent may file
an answer and, either in person or by his attorney, is given an op-
portunity to rebut the case against him by examining and cross-
examining witnesses.72
The Commission has the power to subpoena witnesses, books,
and papers in its investigation of a case before it.78 This power
should not be underestimated simply because it is vested in an ad-
ministrative agency; for failure to obey one of those subpoenas
-constitutes a contempt punishable, upon the application of the com-
mission, by the common pleas court. '74
The hearing examiner is not bound by the rules of evidence-
but shall, in ascertaining the practices followed by the respond-
ent, take into account all reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence, statistical or otherwise, produced at the hearing...
provided that nothing contained in this section shall be con-
strued to authorize or require any person to observe the propor-
tion which persons of any race, color, religion, national origin,
or ancestry bear to the total population or in accordance with
any criterion other than the individual qualifications of the
applicant.75
The first part of this provision reflects the view that strict eviden-
tiary rules should not restrict the fact-finding process of an admin-
istrative agency. Because discrimination is often difficult to prove,
69 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (b) (Page 1965). Additional requirements pro-
vide that the hearings can not be held less than ten days after service of the complaint,
and the hearing will be held in the county where the alleged unlawful practice oc-
curred or where the respondent Tesides or transacts business. The complaint must
be issued by the Commission within one year after the alleged discriminatory conduct
occurred. Id.
70 7 CoMm. REP., supra note 3, at 11.
71 Onso REV. CODE ANN,. § 4112.05 (b) (Page 1965).
72 Id. § 4112.05 (c).
78 Id. § 4112.04(b) (3).
74 Id.
75 OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 4112.05 (e) (Page Supp. 1966).
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the legislature decided a commission free from predetermined rules
of evidence would be better than a court in resolving the issue. The
respondent is protected in that the evidence must be reliable"
while at the same time there is flexibility in permitting the hearing
examiner, experienced in discrimination cases, to determine what is
reliable in each situation, rather than following an established rule
supposedly designed to exclude unreliable evidence but which some-
times has the opposite effect.
The latter part of the above quoted passage from Ohio's fair
employment law reflects the legislature's desire to specifically reject
endorsement of the quota plan for eliminating racial discrimina.
tion. The proponents of the quota plan believe that current affirma-
tive action is necessary to make up for past discriminations. It is
not enough for employers to merely be "colorblind" by hiring em-
ployees on the basis of qualifications alone, but given two applicants
for a job-one white and the other Negro-they should hire the
Negro even though the white is better qualified until they reach
their quota (proportion of Negroes to whites in their business sim-
ilar to that in the population as a whole). This idea has been criti-
cized as being counter-educative (a type of reverse discrimination
which embitters whites because of the preferential treatment shown
Negroes) and an uneconomical use of human resources.1" Similar
to Ohio, Congress specifically rejected the quota plan in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.78
Because of its limited use, it appears that the formal public
hearing is more form- than substance. Currently, its utility seems to
be as a threat to coerce voluntary compliance by the desire to avoid
being subjected to the adverse publicity attending such a public
hearing. Despite the present situation, however, an increase in the
number of public hearings is anticipated in future years because
civil rights pressure will continue to mount, 0 the number of charges
filed will increase, 0 and increased efficiency in handling cases will
permit more to come within the limitation which prevents resort
to a public hearing if the commission has failed to issue a complaint
76 In addition, the statute requires that the testimony at the hearing be under
oath and that no person may be compelled to be a witness against himself. oio
REv. CoDE ANN. § 4112.05 (f) (Page 1965).
77 Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Dis.
crimination: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHi. L. REV. 817 (1967).
78 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2 (1964).
79 A. Ross & H. HiLL, supra note 63, at 512.
80 7 CoaNt. REP., supra note 3, at 13.
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"within one year after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practices
were committed.""'
(f) Cease and Desist Order
If there is insufficient evidence to find the respondent guilty,
then the complaint is dismissed and the complainant, as in the case
of a Commission determination of no probable cause,82 may obtain
judicial review.
If the Commission determines the respondent has engaged in,
or is engaging in, an unlawful discriminatory practice it will state
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and will cause an order
to be served on the respondent.83 The Commission has been granted
considerable discretion as to the contents of that order as will be
noted from the statutory language:
[The Commission shall issue] ... an order requiring such
respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful discrimina-
tory practice and to take such further affirmative or other action
as will effectuate the purposes of [the fair employment practices
law] ... including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement, or
upgrading of employees with, or without, back pay, admission
or restoration to union membership, including a requirement
for reports of the manner of compliance. If the Commission
directs payment of back pay, it shall make allowance for interim
earnings. Upon the submission of such reports of compliance
the commission may issue a declaratory order stating that the
respondent has ceased to engage in unlawful discriminatory
practices.8 4
The respondent may obtain judicial review of the Commission's
order in the manner explained in connection with the discussion of
probable cause.8 5
(g) Judicial Enforcement
Since the cease and desist order is not self-enforcing the com-
mission must obtain a court order to compel compliance if respond-
ent chooses to ignore the Commission's decision. If respondent fails
to institute a proceeding for judicial review within thirty days from
the service of the Commissioner's order, the Commission may ob-
tain a common pleas court decree "for the enforcement of such
order upon showing that respondent is subject 'to the commission's
81 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 41112.05 (b) (Page 1965).
82 Judicial review is discussed supra note 58.
83 Omo RE . CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (g) (Page 1965).
84 Id. § 4112.05 (g).
85 See supra note 58.
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jurisdiction and resides or transacts business within the county in
which the petition for enforcement is brought."'s If respondent fails
to respond to the court's decree he will be held in contempt of court.
8. Additional Provisions
Ohio's fair employment law requires all employers, labor un-
ions, employment agencies and joint apprenticeship committees
to post in conspicuous places on their premises notices approved
by the Commission and explanatory of the law.87 These notices
are designed to apprise individuals of the content of the law in
the belief that an aggrieved individual aware of the rather simple
procedure will be more likely to file a charge than "turn the other
cheek." The notices also serve as a constant reminder that discrim-
ination is unlawful, and thus may have a deterrent effect on po-
tential discriminators. Failure to post a required notice is punish-
able by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars or more than
five hundred dollars88
A recent enactment makes the process of filing a charge in Ohio
more efficient by granting the authority to administer oaths to the
Commission's staff members.8 9 As charges must be submitted under
oath, this removes the difficulty of a notary not being immediately
available.
Another recent enactment gave the Ohio Civil Rights Com-
mission statutory authority to appeal adverse court decisions "re-
lating to the constitutionality, construction, or interpretation of the
statutes and rules and regulations of the commission and in matters
involving the correctness of the judgment of the court of common
pleas that an order of the commission is not supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence."90 This relieves the complainant
whose resources may be inadequate to sustain the burden of appeal
from an adverse common pleas court review of the Commission's
order and permits the Commission to seek appellate review of mat-
ters of substantial importance to the administration of Ohio's fair
employment practices law.
C. Effectiveness of State Attempts to Eliminate Discrimination in
Employment
It is difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of state laws
86 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.06(h) (Page 1965).
87 .d. § 4112.07.
88 Id. § 4112.99.
89 OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.09 (Page Current Service 1967).
90 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.061 (Page Current Service 1967).
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to eliminate discrimination because there is no way to calculate
the number of unlawful practices that are never reported. Also no
accurate estimation can be made of how many of the cases dismissed
for "no probable cause" involved an unlawful discriminatory prac-
tice but failed for lack of proof.
Specific examples of a segregated company hiring Negroes can
be shown and credited to the efforts of the state commission. In
addition, New York's commission has been in existence long enough
to measure results by the census statistics on employment by occu-
pation and color for 1950 and 1960.
A 1950-60 comparison of nonwhite representation in fourteen
middle- and upper-level occupational categories in New York
State revealed striking increases in nine categories and signifi-
cant improvements in the other five. Moreover, on the average
the gains in nonwhite representation in New York were more
than double, and in several instances more than triple, the
corresponding increases in the total for three Midwestern states
that had nonenforceable laws during 1950-60.91
There seems to be little criticism of the substantive provisions
of a strong fair employment practices law like Ohio's "[It is the
virtually unanimous opinion of experts on . .. fair employment
practices legislation that only administrative enforcement has any
hope of success"92 in eliminating employment discrimination. Crit-
icism, when it exists, usually attributes lack of adequate results to
ineffective administration of the fair employment legislation. In-
sufficient budgets and lack of professional full-time staffing are often
mentioned as points of weakness.
Ohio's Civil Rights Commission reports that "Ohio continues
to forge ahead steadily, if not spectacularly, in its approach to the
fulfillment of the promise of equality for all its citizens."08 "The
procedure does not make for rapid elimination of discrimination
in employment... ."4 There will be those who will demand spec-
tacular results and rapid elimination of discrimination, claiming
Negroes have unjustly suffered too long. No doubt they have, but
if suffering is meant to refer to the economic plight of the Negro
it does little good to confuse one's goal of elimination of poverty
with that of elimination of discrimination. Poverty is still poverty
whether it is spread equally between whites and Negroes or is
more prevalent among Negroes. Also, if it is asserted that the Ne-
91 p. NORGREN & S. HELL, supra note 31, at 144.
92 M. SovERN, supra note 8, at 56.
93 7 CO ,i. REP., suP-a note 3, at 4.
94 Id. at 12.
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gro's suffering stems from the psychological impact of discrimina.
tion and the wounds to his pride from unemployment and under-
employment, a close look should be taken at the spectacular and
rapid method of the government's forcing an employer to hire
a certain percentage of Negroes. It would not seem to help a man's
pride to know he holds his job not because of his qualifications,
but because he is Negro.
It is not the purpose of this comment to discuss policy. The
writer only wishes to point out a belief that many states have suf-
ficient instruments to combat discrimination in employment. These
should not be overlooked; rather efforts should be made to increase
their effectiveness by supporting commission budget increases, en.
couraging filing of charges, and cooperating with commission in.
dustry surveys and educational programs.
III. THE FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
A. Prohibitions and Coverage
To supplement existing state fair employment practices legis-
lation and municipal ordinances and, more importantly, to fill the
vacuum where none existed, Congress on July 2, 1964, passed Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.95 This provided a national
remedy for a national problem.
Congress' creation resembles state laws in its substantive pro-
hibitions. Title VII proscribes discrimination based on race, religion,
color, or national origin whether it be perpetrated by employers,
unions, or employment agencies. The federal law is unique in that
it also prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex. Discrimina-
tory conduct in hiring, compensation, promotion, training, dis-
charge, and union membership are proscribed, as are segregated
working conditions, classification of employees by race, and adver,
tisements suggesting that a racial standard will be applied to job
applicants.9" Those barred from discriminating must post in ap-
propriate places approved notices containing information about the
law,97 and must keep records and make reports as prescribed by
regulation.98
The reach of the federal legislation is limited in two general
ways. First, only "a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce" or the "agent of such a person" is considered an employer
under Title VII. Second, an employer must employ at least twenty-
95 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-15 (1964).
906 Id. § 2000e-2.
97 Id. § 2000e-lO (a).
98 Id. §2000e-8 (c).
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five employees.9 9 In addition, Congress saw fit to exclude several
other groups of employers. Among these are the federal govern-
ment, state governments or any political subdivision thereof, edu-
cational institutions with regard to employees working in educa-
tional activities and all employment in religious educational insti-
tutions, employers on or near Indian reservations with regard to
preferential treatment of Indians, religious institutions with re-
gard to employees working in connection with religious activities,
and private clubs. Although twenty five is purely an arbitrary figure
and some have felt Congress failed to reach far enough,100 the ex-
clusion of enterprises with fewer than twenty five employees was
probably based on the belief that the increased expense would
strike an inverse proportion to the results obtainable. It was hoped
that from one charge filed against a substantial employer, one in.
vestigation would be conducted and one hearing held with the re-
sulting conciliation agreement ending discrimination to the benefit
of a substantial number.
Other exclusions from the Civil Rights Act's definition of "em-
ployer," and therefore from the prohibition against discrimination
created by federal legislation, have been questioned. Exclusion of
federal and state governments from the provisions of Title VII does
not appear to be too serious even though it involves a vast number
of employees- "[a]pproximately one out of every six jobs is on a
government payroll."'10 1 Judicially enforceable constitutional re-
straints, legislative remedies, and executive orders prohibit discrim-
ination by governmental units. But it has been pointed out that
this "exclusion means that victims of government discrimination are
left to their old remedies. If Titie VII offers something better, the
failure to make it available to victims of government discrimina-
tion is regrettable."'' 02 It has been recommended that "Congress
could usefully have supplemented the judicial remedy with the sort
of administrative relief the state commissions are empowered to
99 Id. § 2000e (b). The "affecting commerce" and "twenty-five or more em-
ployees" limitations are also relevant to the definition of employment agencies and
unions.
It should be pointed out that on July 2, 1965, the date the employment discrim-
ination provisions became effective, the law only applied to employers of 100 or more.
On July 2, 1966, it became applicable to employers of 75 or more, and on July 2, 1967,
employers of 50 or more employees were reached. On July 2, 1968, the Act will readh
its fullest coverage, employers of 25 or more.
100 M. Sovmv, supra note 8, at 64-65.
101 Id. at 66.
102 Id.
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give."'10 3- The exclusion of private clubs and Indian tribes has been
criticised on the ground that it detracts "from the basic principle
that racial discrimination in employment is wrong" and reflects a
"confusion of objectives" by Congress. 10 4
B. Procedures
To effectuate the objectives of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was
established. 10 5 It is composed of five members appointed on a bi-
partisan basis by the President of the United States with approval
of the Senate. The Commission's two basic responsibilities are: (1)
the compliance program in which it investigates complaints of dis-
crimination, and if they are found to be justified, a remedy is sought
by the process of conciliation; and (2) the technical assistance pro.
gram in which the Commission offers advice and assistance, educa-
tional aids, and affirmative projects in an effort to promote pro-
grams of voluntary compliance with the objectives of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.10
If a person feels he is the victim of discrimination by an em.
ployer, labor union, or employment agency, he may file with the
Commission a sworn, written charge claiming he has been ag
grieved by an unlawful employment practice.107 Individual com-
missioners may initiate complaints if they receive information lead-
ing them to have "reasonable cause to believe a violation" of Title
VII has occurred. 108 In the case of an isolated violation, the charge
must be filed within ninety days of the date of the alleged act of
discrimination in those states which do not have a fair employment
practices law, and within 210 days in states like Ohio in which the
charging party is required to first proceed before the state fair em-
ployment practices commission, or within thirty days after receipt
of notice of termination of the state proceeding, whichever is ear-
lier.10 9 If the alleged discriminatory practice constitutes a continu-
ing violation, such as the maintenance of a discriminatory senior-
ity system, pay scale, or segregated facilities, the charge may be filed
103 Id. at 250.
104 Id. at 66-67.
105 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
106 Hearings on S. 1308, supra note 10, Statement of Stephen N. Shulman, Chair
man, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (1964). See E.E.O.C. Regulation 1601.11, 29 C.F.R.
1601.11 (1966), for specifics to be included in the charge.
108 Id.
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (d) (1964).
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with the Commission at any time.1 0
After a charge has been filed, the Commission conducts an in-
vestigation, following which it will either dismiss the charge on a
finding that the facts do not support it or will find reasonable cause
to believe the claimant has been unlawfully discriminated against.
If "cause"' is found, the Commission will attempt to conciliate in
the hope of obtaining voluntary compliance with the provisions of
Title VII. Where conciliation fails to obtain voluntary compliance,
the aggrieved person may, within thirty days after notification
thereof, file a civil action against the alleged discriminating party
in federal district court.-"' If the court finds in favor of the person
filing the charge, it may grant an injunction and order other ap-
propriate affirmative action which may include reinstatement or
hiring, with or without back pay.- 2 "Upon timely application, the
court may, in its discretion, permit the Attorney General to inter-
vene in such civil action if he certifies that the case is of general
public importance." 13
During the investigation of a charge, the Commission or its
designated representatives are authorized at all reasonable times to
have access to and the right to copy any relevant evidence of any
person being investigated.14 Should a person refuse to comply with
a written demand for permission to examine evidence, the Com-
mission is authorized to seek an order from an appropriate federal
district court compelling compliance.""
Congress has banned public disclosure of the contents of a
charge or the results of investigations prior to the institution of
court proceedings."16 This is in line with state laws which recognize
the policies behind concealment until the public hearing stage is
reached. In order to encourage frankness in conciliation, there is
also a prohibition against any disclosure of things said or done as a
part of the conciliation process without the consent of the parties
110 1 U.S. EQUAL EmPLOYMENT OPPoRTnrY COMm. ANN. REP. 49-50 (1966).
111 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (1964).
112 Id. § 2000e-5 (g).
113 Id. § 2000e-5 (e). Another provision allowing the Attorney General to insti-
tute litigation in the employment discrimination area should be noted. Under 78
Stat. 261, 42 US.C. § 2000M-6 (a) (1964) the Attorney General may bring a dvil action
in the appropriate federal district court whenever he has reasonable cause to believe
a person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the
full enjoyment ,by others of the rights secured by Title VII.
"14 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-8 (a) (1964).
115 Id. § 2000e-9 (b).
116 Id. §§ 2000e-5 (a) and -8 (e).
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involved. 11 Criminal penalties are provided for violations of these
prohibitions by members of the Commission or employees thereof.118
Title VII provides that where the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice occurs in the state or subdivision thereof which has
an enforceable law prohibiting such practice and under which an
authority is established to grant or seek relief, that state or local
authority must receive an opportunity to process the charge before
the procedures of the Commission may be invoked. 110 The person
aggrieved may not file a charge with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission until sixty days after the commencement of
state proceedings 120 or within thirty days of the termination of the
state proceedings,' 21 whichever is earlier. If a charge is submitted
to the Commission which should have been initially brought be-
fore a state agency, the Commission will forward the charge to such
agency. After the expiration of sixty days the Commission will con-
tact the charging party to see if he wishes it to assume jurisdiction.
If "the charging party is satisfied with the state agency's disposi-
tion, the Commission will not proceed further with the case.' 1122
Congress' choice to leave operative and defer to enforceable
state fair employment practices laws was a wise one.
Title Vii's procedures for implementing its bans on dis-
crimination are probably inferior to those in many states. To
have ousted state law, then, would have left Negroes in those
states worse off than they were before. In addition, a number
of states without enforceable fair employment practices laws
decided, after Title VII was enacted, that their own administra
tion would be preferable to the federal variety: the result was
a flurry of new statutes that seem considerably superior to the
federal law. 123
C. Effectiveness
No doubt passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
117 Id. § 2000e-5 (a); 1 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMM. ANN. REP.
(1966).
118 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 (a), -8 (e) (1964).
119 Id. § 2000e-5 (b).
120 Id.
121 Id. § 2000e-5 (d).
122 EQUAL EIMPLOYMENT CoMM. REP., supra note 117. See Memorandum of Under-
standing Between The Ohio Civil Rights Comm. and The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Comm., COm,. REP., supra note 3, at 91-96.
123 M. SOVERN, supra note 8, at 92. The author discusses four important advant.
ages in allowing the states to continue their campaigns against discrimination: preser.
vation of accumulated experience and relationships; an atmosphere of local involve.
ment; conservation of federal resources; opportunity to experiment. Id. at 92.93.
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was a significant event in this country's effort to eliminate discrim-
ination in the employment area. It marked the first time that the
Congress of the United States had declared discrimination by pri-
vate employers, employment agencies, and unions unlawful. The
nation's policy is clear; the question remaining is whether Con-
gress' creation goes far enough to substantially implement that
policy.
The mere fact that the law exists will inhibit some who might
otherwise discriminate, although it would be idealistic to assume
many of those with a personal bias will cease discriminating merely
because that is what the law commands. There are those with no
particular bias who discriminated in order to avoid disfavor of
their peers or conflict with the mores of their community, who
might change their practices and avoid criticism by blaming it on
the new federal law. Probably a much larger group consists of
those who will ignore the law until a complaint is filed pursuant
thereto. Of these, some will give in to the conciliatory efforts of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission while others will
firmly resist compliance with the law. 24 If this latter group is of
significant size, it would seem that by withholding enforcement pow-
ers from the Commission, Congress's effort to eliminate discrimina-
tion in employment was rather half-hearted. The Chairman of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has pointed out that
"a sizable minority of persons whose rights to equal employment
opportunity have been violated do not at present receive redress
from the Commission. Their only recourse is to initiate private
suit, unless the Attorney General finds that a pattern or practice
of discrimination exists."'2- 5 The extent of this sizeable minority
is as follows:
In fiscal year 1966 conciliation of 191 charges was com-
pleted. Of these, 131 were successful or partially successful; or
69 percent of the total.
So far during fiscal year 1967, conciliation has been com-
pleted for 628 charges, of which 357 were successful or partially
successful, for a rate of 57 percent of the total.
As you can see, the percentage of successful conciliations
has decreased, and the trend continues in that direction.126
The difficulty with relegating an aggrieved person to the courts
if the Commission fails to get results is that, of those who will pre-
severe this far, many will quit because "the aggrieved may have to
124 M. SovE, supra note 8, at 101-102.
125 Hearings on S. 1308, supra note 10, at 54.
126 Id.
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pay fees, security and costs for himself and, if unable to prove dis-
crimination, for the defendant. Most victims of employment dis-
crimination are in no position to take such an economic risk." 127
A bill 128 presently in Congress would substantially increase
the effectiveness of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion by giving it enforcement powers similar to those held by state
agencies and discussed previously herein in connection with Ohio's
Civil Rights Commission.120 Under this bill, after the Commission
determines that further conciliation efforts are unwarranted, the
following steps would take place:
The Commission would issue and cause to be served upon
the respondent a complaint stating the facts on which discrim.
ination is alleged.
A hearing would then be held before the EEOC or its mem-
ber or agent.
After the hearing, if the Commission found that the re-
spondent had engaged in an unlawful employment practice, it
would state its findings of fact and issue a cease-and.desist order.
This order could include appropriate affirmative relief, such as
reinstatement and payment of back wages, and could also re-
quire the respondent to make reports from time to time on the
extent of his compliance. If the Commission found that no un-
lawful employment practice occurred, the complaint would of
course be dismissed.Once a cease-and-desist order was issued, the EEOC could
petition a court of appeals where the unlawful employment
practice occurred or wherein the respondent resided or trans-
acted business for the enforcement of the Commission's order.
The Attorney General would then litigate the case.
Any respondent or person aggrieved by a Commission or.
der could likewise obtain review of the order in an appropriate
court of appeals.
The aggrieved person would have the right to bring a civil
action ... if within 180 days of filing his charge the Commis-
sion had.., failed to issue a complaint or upon receipt of a
127 Id. at 51.
128 S. 1308, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
129 Effective enforcement machinery is indispensable to an effective equal
employment opportunity law. The experience of state and local agencies
show i.hat impotence will frequently be met with intransigence, that concilia-
tion works best when compulsion is waiting in the wings.
M. SovERN, supra note 8, at 80.
The Commission has had only limited success in obtaining voluntary com-
pliance. Enforceable cease and desist authority will undoubtedly lead to
greater success. The Commission's effectiveness as a conciliator would be en-
hanced. Those subject to the Act will be more willing to negotiate. Experience
of the state fair employment agencies support this proposition.
Hearings on S. 1308, supra note 10, at 51.
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notice.., of its intention not to issue a complaint, whichever
is earlier. This would include the situation where failure to
issue a complaint resulted from... voluntary compliance satis-
factory to the Commission, but not to the aggrieved person.13 0
It is difficult to measure the total effect in eliminating discrim-
ination that has evolved out of passage of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, but it is known that out of over 16,000 charges
received by the Commission, 488 were successfully or partially con-
ciliated through the use of the federal procedure.3 1 An increased
staff supplied with an increased budget could handle more charges
in less time with more adequate investigations. If, in addition, the
Commission were given enforcement powers to force into com-
pliance those who resisted conciliation, and to use as a threat in
the process of conciliation, a substantial increase in results could be
expected.
Even more difficult to measure is the effectiveness of the Com-
mission's educational, promotional, and technical assistance pro-
grams. The hundreds of speeches, press releases, meetings and
pamphlets have helped, and will continue to help accomplish the
purposes of Title VII through the medium of education.
IV. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Another federal agency which has become increasingly impor-
tant in prohibiting certain discriminatory practices by labor unions
and employers is the National Labor Relations Board. This prohi-
bition arises out of the "duty of fair representation" which is no-
where expressed in the National Labor Relations Act,13 2 but which
has been implied from its provisions. Under the Act, when a union
is selected by a majority of employees to be their collective bar-
gaining agent, it becomes the exclusive representative of all the em-
ployees whether they desire to be represented by it or not.1 33 Since
the union is the exclusive representative, all employees are bound
by its collective agreements and none may choose to have any other
union bargain for him or even to bargain for himself.1 84 "Because
the majority choice is imposed upon everyone in this way, the Su-
130 Hearings on S. 1308, supra note 10, at 54-55.
131 Id. at 53-54. These figures, as of April 12, 1967, do not tell tie whole story.
Many of the 16,000 charges were referred to state agencies, dosed for lack of juri.dic.
tion, or returned for additional information. Many others had not yet reached the
conciliation stage.
132 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1965).
133 N.L.P.A., 29 US.C. § 159 (a) (1965).
134 M. SovErN, supra note 8, at 144-45.
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preme Court has consistently held that these statutes require the
union to represent everyone in the unit fairly."'u 8 Unions violate
this "duty" when they seek the removal of Negroes from their jobs
in order to make room for whites,130 deny equal promotion oppor-
tunities to Negroes, 13 7 fail to protect Negroes from discriminatory
demotions and discharges,' 38 cause an employer to discriminate
against Negroes with respect to job classifications, 80 insist upon
segregated facilities,140 or maintain and enforce an arrangement
whereby work is distributed discriminatorily in favor of an all white
local over an all Negro local and whereby the two are forbidden to
work together.' 4 '
Since this "duty of fair representation" is not expressed in the
statutes, the question arises as to how it is to be enforced. The
NLRB has two basic avenues of enforcement when unions unfairly
represent some employees: "refusal by the Board to aid unions to
become or remain exclusive representatives . . . and unfair labor
practice proceedings."' 4 2 If the Board's power were limited to re-
voking or denying certification as exclusive representative, thereby
making uncertified unions vulnerable to raids by other unions and
unable to file unfair labor-practice charges against employers, en-
forcement would be relatively ineffective against many of the strong
unions who "could get along quite well without their certifica-
tions."' 43 It would be particularly impotent against the strong craft
unions which have reputations of being most discriminatory. 144
Unfair labor practice proceedings constitute a far more
powerful sanction than [refusing to recognize a union as ex-
clusive representative] . . . because they eventuate, when the
charge is well founded, in a cease-and-desist order directing the
135 Id. at 145. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), involving the
Railway Labor Act; accord, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) involving Rail.
way Labor Act; Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1956) involving the National Labor
Relations Act; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949)
involving the Railway Labor Act.
136 Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
137 Dillard v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 199 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952).
138 Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. 41 (1957).
139 Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
140 Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
88 S. Ct. 53 (1967).
141 NLRB v. Local 1367, I.L.A., 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
88 S. Ct. 58 (1967).
142 MA. SOvERN. supra note 8, at 155.
143 Id. at 160.
144 R. MARSHALL, TaE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR 239 (1965).
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respondent to fulfill his obligations under the law. Such an
order, when enforced by a federal court of appeals, is backed
up by the court's contempt powers. If, therefore, violation of
the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice, a
violator can be ordered to represent fairly and can be fined or
imprisoned for disobedience of that order.1 45
The problem with finding violation of the "duty of fair repre-
sentation" to be an unfair labor practice was the Act's failure to
mention such a duty. Not until 1962, did the NLRB hold unfair
representation to be an unfair labor practice.14 0 The Board rea-
soned that section 8 (b) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7]
.",14 and that the right to be represented fairly, although not
mentioned in section 7,148 is guaranteed by that section. Along the
same reasoning, section 8 (a) (1) provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7];' '149
therefore when an employer accedes to a union request which is a
violation of the "duty of fair representation," lie has committed an
unfair labor practice by interfering with a section 7 right.
Although the NLRB had held unfair representation to be an
unfair labor practice, there remained until recently doubt as to
whether the courts would accept this position. This doubt was en-
hanced by the possibility that passage of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 might be held to have pre-empted NLRB from
cases involving employment discrimination.
In Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB15 0 the court upheld
the Board's position, finding that a local union, in refusing to rep-
resent complaining Negro members in their grievances in regard
to seniority and segregated plant facilities, in a fair and impartial
manner, committed an unfair labor practice by restraining such
145 M. SovERN, supra note 8, at 161. Original footnote excluded.
146 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F. 2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963). This case did not involve racial discrimination, but the following
decisions similarly holding unfair representation to be an unfair labor practice did:
Independent Metal Wrorkers Union, Local 1, 147 NLRB 1573 (1964); Local No. 12,
United Rubber Workers, 150 NLR.B 312 (1961), enforcement granted, 368 F. 2d
12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 53 (1967); Local 1367, I.L.A., 148 NLRD
897 (1964), enforcement granted, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct.
58 (1967).
147 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (1965).
148 Id. § 157 (1965).
19 d. d 152 (a) (1) (1965) .
3.50 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 88 S. Ct. 53 (1967).
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members in the exercise of their right to bargain collectively through
their chosen representatives. 15' The court expressly held that "a
breach of the duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor
practice. ' 152 The court also said that the fact that Congress pro-
vided specific protection to employees from union and employer
discrimination in the area of civil rights by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 does not preclude determination that a breach
of a union's duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor
practice.153
In another recent case, I. L. A. Local 1367 v. NLRB,154 the
court upheld an NLRB cease-and-desist order against the Long-
shoremen's union. The union had chartered two locals, one all-
white and the other all-Negro, to represent longshoremen in a Gulf
Coast area. The NLRB found a violation of section 8 (b) (1) (A)
of the Taft Act in the union's maintaining and enforcing a seventy-
five to twenty-five percent work distribution, with seventy-five per-
cent of available work being allocated to the white local, and by
maintaining and enforcing an arrangement forbidding, assignment
of white and Negro gangs to work together.
In both the above cases, the Board ordered the unions to cease
the discriminatory practices, and the orders were upheld by the
courts. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari
in each case, which technically did not affirm the lower courts' de-
cisions, but had "the practical effect," an NLRB official commented,
of giving "the Board a green light to 'proceed with what we are
doing' for '[i]t's fair to assume the Board now will apply its author-
ity' against unions that discriminate."'1 5
These decisions are significant in their recognition of racial
discrimination constituting a violation of the "duty of fair repre-
sentation" as an unfair labor practice, thus giving the NLRB power
to issue cease-and-desist orders - a power which the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission lacks. They point out that the
NLRB can and will play an increasing role in the battle to elimin-
ate discrimination in employment. 56 This can be a very helpful
151 Id. at 20.
152 Id. at 24.
153 Id.
154 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 58 (1967).
155 Wall Street Journal, Oct. 10, 1967, at 4, col. 4 (midwest cd.).
150 Scholarly commentary on the "duty of fair representation" and its possible
extent appear in: Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VMLANOVA L. Rzv, 151
(1957); Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against
Union Racial Discrimination? 24 MD. L. Riv. 113 (1964); Sherman, Union's Duty of
Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L, REv. 771 (1965);
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remedy both because of the Board's enforcement powers and be-
cause the government pays the expenses, including the cost of liti-
gation.
V. PREsmENT's ExEcUTrVE ORDERS AND THE OFFICE OF
FEDERAL COINRACT COMPLIANCE
Contractors dealing with the federal government are subject
to another weapon in the arsenal of methods devised to attack dis-
crimination in employment. Nondiscrimination clauses in govern-
ment contracts have been required since President Roosevelt's Ex-
ecutive Order in 1941.157 The current Executive Orders abolished
the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and
vested its authority over government contractors in the Labor De-
partment's Office of Federal Contract Compliance. Jurisdiction over
discrimination in federal government employment is vested in the
Civil Service Commission. Generally, all contractors and subcon-
tractors working on contracts and federally assisted construction
which exceed 10,000 dollars or contracts or purchase orders for
standard commercial supplies and raw materials which exceed 100,-
000 dollars are subject to certain duties flowing from the nondis-
crimination clauses in their contracts. They must not only refrain
from discrimination, but must also take affirmative action to ensure
equal job opportunities. Notice of their nondiscrimination policy
must be in all advertisements for employees, on posters, and must
be given to their unions. They are obligated to submit to compliance
investigations and file reports as required by the Secretary of Labor.
Complaints of discrimination may be filed with the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance or the particular federal agency which
issued the contract. Filing must be within ninety days from the
date of the alleged discrimination, unless an extension is granted
upon a showing of good cause. If investigation indicates the exist-
ence of an apparent violation of the nondiscrimination clause, ef-
forts will be made to seek compliance by conference, conciliation,
mediation, or persuasion. If such efforts fail, sanctions may be im-
posed, including publishing the names of violators, cancelling or
suspending the contract, barring the contractor from future govern-
ment contracts, recommending that the Justice Department bring
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 Cor. L.
Rxv: 563 (1962); M. SovN, LEGA..L RsmA=s oN RAcIAL DsawumiNAmnoN 144-175
(1966); Note, Racial Discrimination and the NLRB: The Hughes Tool Case, 50
VA. L. Rv. 1221 (1965); Note, Administrative Enforcement of the Right to Fair
Representation: The Miranda Case, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (1964).
157 Executive Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
158 Executive Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965).
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suit to enforce the clause, recommending the institution of pro-
ceedings under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, or, if the contrac-
tor filed false information, recommending that the Justice Depart-
ment bring criminal proceedings against him.
With this wide range of penalties and sanctions the Executive
Order can provide an effective remedy against discrimination by
government contractors. In addition, although the obligation under
a government contract really runs only from the contractor to the
government, unions are also affected. It is not a defense for a con-
tractor to claim he cannot correct his company's racial imbalance
because it is forced to accept labor supplied by unions.150 Either
he provides equal opportunity, or he does not get government con-
tracts.
Since the nondiscrimination clause contains the contractor's
pledge not to discriminate, and, in addition, includes his promise
to take affirmative action, this affirmative action imparts a stronger
meaning than mere color-blindness.' G° Precisely what is required
is unclear, but "affirmative action" has reached the point where the
government is threatening to institute a quota plan whereby con-
tracts would not be granted for federally subsidized construction
projects, unless contractors could produce evidence that Negroes
were holding a specified number of jobs.10 1
VI. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE;
LEGAL THREATS
This section is devoted to a discussion of one particular area of
the employment field and the attempts that have been made to break
down the racial barriers in it. It is deemed worthy of discussion be-
cause the building trades industry has contained an unusually high
rate of racial imbalance in employment opportunities and has been
fervently resistent to change. Also, the remedial steps taken by
aggrieved individuals and civil rights organizations have strayed
from the conventional ones discussed.
A. The Situation - An Irresistible Force Versus an Immovable
Object
The ability of labor unions to discriminate through denial of
membership has its most far-reaching effect in a situation where
employers depend primarily upon unions for their labor supply.
159 T. O'Hanlon, The Case Against The Unions, FORTUNE, Jan. 1968, at 190.
160 M. SovERN, supra note 8, at 142.
161 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 1968, at 1, col. 5 (midwest ed.).
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This is true of the building trades industry where contractors look
to the unions with which they deal as their primary source of man-
power. These unions frequently maintain "hiring halls" which are
open only to union members. In many cases employers have signed
agreements with such unions obligating themselves to fill their labor
requirements through the union hiring balls rather than through
public or private employment agencies. The obvious effect of such
a situation is that denial of union membership to a Negro is the
practical equivalent to denial of employment. 0 2 In addition,
through the unions' control of apprenticeship training programs,
they have the power to exclude Negroes from jobs and the oppor-
tunity to acquire necessary skills. The construction industry is
"the sector of our economy with more registered apprenticeship
programs than any other and the object of some of the bitterest
protest of the whole civil rights movement."103
Racial imbalance in this segment of the employment field is
apparent; fixing the responsibility for it is less clear. Both unions
and employers have continued to "pass the buck" and attribute
the existence of the situation to causes beyond their control or of
a nondiscriminatory nature. Unions claim their lack of Negro mem-
bership results from the absense of skilled Negro craftsmen. Con-
tractors deny responsibility for the racial imbalance on their projects
because they hire exclusively from unions and cannot compel the
unions to stop discriminating in membership. On the other hand,
unions claim they are not discriminating on the basis of race, but
that because a proposed member must have a sponsor and must be
accepted by the other union members, only relatives or close friends
of existing members are accepted. The continued existence of the
imbalance has led to the situation where the emphasis is no longer
on establishing culpability, but rather on curing the problem by
fixing a definite responsibility. Particularly in the area of public
works projects, where state and federal funds are involved, the
immediate goal has become one of getting Negroes on the job. If
unions refuse to refer Negro craftsmen, contractors must seek them
elsewhere. Promises are no longer adequate; today visible proof is
necessary.
B. The Ethridge Case - Fixing the Responsibility
In Ethridge v. Rhodes'0 4 plaintiffs brought a class action
102 P. NORGREN & S. HILL, supra note 31, at 47.
163 M. SovEN, supra note 8, at 177 (original footnote omitted).
164 268 F. Supp. 83 (51). Ohio 1967); Noted in 29 Outo Sr. LJ. 247 (1968).
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against state officials to enjoin them from entering into contracts for
construction of a building on the Ohio State University campus. The
court accepted plaintiffs' contention that qualified Negroes would
be unable to get jobs on the construction project because the pro-
posed contractors would hire exclusively from craft unions which
denied membership to Negroes. Because state officials knew about
and acquiesced in this practice and were going to place the state
in a position of interdependence with private individuals by enter-
ing into the contracts, the state would become a joint participant
in a pattern of racially discriminatory, conduct. This joint participa-
tion was held to constitute a type of "state action" proscribed by
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
In order to grant the injunction the court had to find the
threatened injury irreparable and that there was no other adequate
remedy in spite of the existence of state and federal statutes con-
cerning equal -employment opportunities. It was necessary to recog-
nize that the procedure under Ohio's Fair Employment Practices
law could redress plaintiffs' pecuniary damage, but the court as-
serted that neither the state nor federal statutes took any steps to
mend the psychological damage that would be caused by the racially
discriminatory exclusion of plaintiffs and the class they represented
from participation in the construction project. In addition, the
court followed the lead of Brown v. Board of Education1'" in point-
ing out that when discrimination receives the sanction of the gov-
ernment, it has a particularly harmful sociological and psychological
impact. Thus the pecuniary awards available under the statutes
were held not to provide an adequate remedy because the kind of
injury caused by discrimination is not subject to monetary valua-
tion. The court also mentioned the delay involved in administrative
proceedings as a reason for their inadequacy as a remedy.
On this basis the court enjoined the state officials from entering
into contracts with contractors who secure their labor force from
unions which' discriminate against Negroes. By so doing, the court
placed the primary responsibility for curing the racial imbalance
on public works projects on the state, a party only tangentially in-
volved in the discriminatory conduct. This case marks a trend away
from focusing all attention on the culpable party, toward a policy
of bringing pressure to bear on the force best able to achieve im-
mediate results.
165 349 U.S. 294, (1955), modifying 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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C. Behind the Scenes of Ethridge - How Is the Responsibility to
Be Exercised?
Assuming the judge realized that, although Ethridge only ap-
plied to one building, if the precedent is followed it "could halt
all public construction where Negroes are not granted equal access
to employment,"16 G he was probably convinced the state could ex-
pediently force a change in practices. Plaintiffs in Ethridge were
faced with the deadlock between the contractors' claims that the
unions were the cause of the alleged discrimination and that they
used the unions as a source of labor because of practical necessity,
and the unions' claims that qualified Negro craftsmen were not
available and that they could not be expected to admit nonqualified
Negroes when there were qualified caucasians waiting for member-
ship. Thus during the proceedings in this case they filed a "Proposal
By Which Relief May Be Granted," which attempted to spell out
ways in which Negroes could be employed on the building project
in question. Plaintiffs proposed to remedy the situation by forcing
contractors awarded public works contracts to seek Negro skilled
craftsmen from sources other than the allegedly discriminatory
unions. It was pointed out that with the exception of two unions -
the electricians, and the plumbers and pipe fitters - the contractors
in accordance with their union contracts have the sole right to hire
all their employees. Because there are no hiring hall agreements in
all but the two trades mentioned, these contractors can go outside
the discriminating unions and hire Negro workers directly. In the
trades which have hiring hall agreements, plaintiffs asserted the
contractors could avoid them. Since they are required by their con-
tracts with the state to provide qualified work forces (as pointed
out in the part of this study dealing with state laws against discrim-
ination Ohio law requires that all public works contracts contain
nondiscrimination clauses) and since the two unions which have
hiring halls are obligated by their agreements with the contractors
to supply qualified work forces, if the unions fail to refer skilled
Negro workers, the contractors will be free under their union con-
tracts to seek such workers outside of the hiring halls. Having re-
futed the necessity of using unions as the sole labor source, plain-
tiffs then suggested several sources of skilled, Negro, non-union
craftsmen available to contractors. In addition, plaintiffs proposed
that Negro high school graduates be placed on the building project
as apprentices.
"The concept of the proposal was to suggest provisions which
166 FoRTu m, supra note 159, at 173.
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the court could order included in project contracts '107 and, td
implement the order, plaintiffs proposed that the previously dis-
cussed Office ,of Federal Contract Compliance serve as a referee
"to determine whether the efforts of contractors to offer equal em-
ployment opportunities have been reasonable and adequate." 108
In response, defendants alleged that plaintiffs' proposal would
accomplish less than Substitute House Bill No. 457, then pending
in the Ohio General Assembly.109 This bill, which was claimed a
virtual certainty to be enacted, provided that:
Any provision of a hiring hall contract or agreement which
obligates a contractor to hire ... only such employees as are re-
ferred to him by a labor organization shall be void as against
public policy 'and unenforceable with respect to employment
nder ~any public works contract unless.., such labor organi-
zation has in effect procedures for referring qualified employees
for hire without regard to race, color, religion, national origin,
or ancestry and unless such labor organization includes in its
apprentice and journeymen membership, or otherwise has avail,
able for job referral without discrimination, qualified em-
ployees, both whites and non-whites ... j70
Since this bill would invalidate exclusive hiring hall agreements
with discriminating unions, it would free contractors to seek labor
from other nondiscriminating sources. This is approximately the
same result requested by plaintiffs except that it would be a state
statute rather than a court decision. In addition, plaintiffs' proposal
that Negro high school graduates be put on the job ignored the pos-
sibility that there might be a supply of individuals registered in the
apprenticeship program who were awaiting the opportunity to
work.' 7 '
Plaintiff replied that even if Substitute House Bill No. 457 were
to be enacted it would not resolve the issues in the Ethridge case.
First, the bill concerned only those craft unions which operate
under exclusive hiring hall agreements of which there were only
two on the building project involved in the case. Second, the
167 Letter from Lewis M. Steel, attorney for plaintiffs, to Judge J. P. Klnncary,
U.S. District Court, May 12, 1967, Civil Action 67-53, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.
168 Plaintiffs' Proposal By Which Relief May Be Granted 4, Civil Action 67-53,
US. District Court, S.D. Ohio Eastern Division.
169 H. 457, 10th Gen. Assembly, Ist Sess. (1967).
170 Id., subsequently enacted as Orno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 153.581, 153.591 (Page
Current Service 1967).
171 Letter from William B. Saxbe, Attorney General of Ohio, to Judge J. P.
Kinneary, U.S. District Court, May 10, 1967, Civil Action 67-55, S.). Ohio, Eastern
Division.
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"bill is not self-enforcing and therefore does not resolve the es-
sential question of state enforcement."' 1 2 The state must see to it
that its public works contractors are hiring qualified Negro crafts-
men whether they be referred to them by unions or must be ac-
quired from outside union sources; otherwise, the state is partici-
pating in a pattern of racial discrimination violative of the four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution.1 3
It will be noted that both plaintiffs and defendants sought to
allow contractors to hire outside discriminating unions. The pri-
mary goal was to put Negroes on the job; it was secondarily hoped
that unions would abandon their discriminatory policies in order
to maintain their position as exclusive hiring sources for the con-
tractors. The difference arose as to whether the state could fulfill
its responsibility by passing the proposed legislation freeing the
contractor from agieements with discriminating unions, and there-
after making the contractor bear the burden of discrimination
claims, or whether the state should have the additional responsibil-
ity of making sure its contractors provide equal employment op-
portunities.
The court in Ethridge held that state officials could enter into
contracts only with -contractors "who will obligate themselves and
be legally eligible and prepared actually to secure a labor force
only from sources that will reasonably insure equal job opportuni-
ties to all qualified persons ... without regard to race, color, or
membership or non-membership in the labor union."'1 4 In other
words, the court's opinion ordered the state to require its potential
contractors to demonstrate three things, although it failed to indi-
cate just how and to what extent this was to be done. The contractor
who submits a bid on a state project must in some manner "obli-
gate himself" to secure his labor only from sources that will reason-
ably insure equal opportunities. In addition, he must be "legally
eligible" to secure labor from such source, apparently meaning that
he must not be bound by a hiring hall agreement with a discrim-
inating union. Finally, the contractor must demonstrate that he is
"prepared actually" to obtain his labor force from a source that
reasonably insures non-discrimination.
D. Events After Ethridge - The State Takes Action
Several weeks after the decision in Ethridge, Ohio's General
172 Letter, supra note 167.
173 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US. 715 (1961).
174 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 90 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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Assembly passed Substitute House Bill No. 457176 thereby making
every contractor "legally eligible" to hire from non-discriminating
sources. No longer could public works contractors claim they were
bound to secure workers from a discriminating union since the new
law made all such agreements void and unenforceable.1 70
Several days after the enactment of the new statute, another
step was taken to assure compliance with the court order in Eth-
ridge. The Governor issued an Executive Order 1 7 which, in es-
sence, proclaims that the state will not deem responsive any bid
from a contractor who fails to file with his bid pledges and com-
mitments to the effect that:
(1) He and his subcontractors will act effectively to insure
that employees are selected and treated equally without regard
to race; color, religion, national origin, or ancestry.
(2) He and his subcontractors will use as hiring sources
only those in which access to referral facilities is open to all
qualified persons without discrimination.
(3) He and his subcontractors will avail themselves where
appropriate of the provisions of the new statute [referred to
previously as Substitute House Bill No. 457178 ] and hire outside
the discriminating union.
(4) He and his subcontractors will accept compliance re-
views and furnish all information requested.
If a breach of these pledges and commitments is discovered the
contract after thirty days notice will be suspended for not more than
thirty days, during which time the contractor may cure his breach.
Failure to do so results in cancellation of his contract.
The results of these first attempts by the state to exercise its
Ethridge-born responsibility remain to be seen. The implications
of the Executive Order would seem to be that a contractor in addi-
tion to obligating himself through pledges submitted with his bid
to secure labor from non-discriminating sources would, in fact, be
"prepared actually" to hire from such sources and insure equal
opportunity to Negro applicants for fear of having his contract can-
celled. Additionally, it may be hoped that unions which had prev-
iously excluded Negroes will abandon their discriminatory policies
rather than face giving up the opportunity to be hiring sources for
public works contractors. It would certainly not help the unions'
bargaining position for contractors to develop the habit of hiring
175 OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 153.581, 153,591 (Page Current Service 1967).
176 Id.
177 Executive Order of June 5, 1967.
178 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 153.581, 153.591 (Page Current Service 1967).
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skilled non-union labor. Even though the new law and Executive
Order only apply to public works, some carry-over into private con-
struction might be expected.
As to the effect of the above plan, some assert that contractors
will be tempted to hire unqualified Negroes, if qualified are un-
available, in order to attract and hold public works contracts
through' showing non-discrimination by a substantial number of
Negroes being on their payrolls. From this presumption it is ar-
gued that, in addition to the reverse discrimination caused by such
action, the public would end up with inferior construction because
of the use of below-par labor. Although this situation could occur,
it is made less likely by the fact that the contractor must meet speci-
fications and inspections, and would not desire to be responsible
for an inferior job.
Determining what the public works contractor must do to sat-
isfy these new requirements is not exactly clear. The situation is
similar to what has been pointed out about the federal contractor
program:
The relevant contractual language [in federal contracts]
does not, as do other fair employment schemes, merely forbid
discrimination. It imposes an 'affi-mative' duty on the con-
tractor to see that he does not discriminate. Such a pledge seems
at first glance a puzzle. The only precise thing one can say about
an affirmative duty not to do something is that it is the con-
verse of a negative duty not to refrain from doing something.
Beyond this all that is clear is that an imaginative lawyer can
take these words and run and run and run.179
The Executive Order and the court's order in Ethridge, while im-
posing an affirmative duty on state public works contractors to hire
from non-discriminating sources, leave the initial decision as to
what is a discriminating labor source in the hands of the contractor
without guidelines or precedents. Perhaps at first the hiring of a
small number of Negroes will assure compliance. However, once
the barrier is broken down, it would seem inevitable that some form
of quota system will have to be used to determine degrees of dis-
crimination. This will result in a contractor who has less than a
certain percentage of Negro employees having the burden of prov-
ing that his source of labor does not discriminate or suffering the
loss of his contract. This would seem to be a difficult task.
[I]t may . . . be that a bidder who reports substantially
fewer Negroes than his competitors ... will not be awarded a
179 Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negrocs Through Laws Against
Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. Cm. L. REXV. 817, 845 (1967).
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contract as a result of his 'discrimination'. Since the contract'
is of great value, employment qualifications can be sacrificed,
and our 'hopefuls' [for government contracts] would be well
advised to match their competitors, perhaps even outdo them,
in implementing a 'fair employment practice' program.
To be sure, a program of this character puts Negroes to
work but at a substantial 'cost. The principal of color-blindness
in employment is abandoned for the hidden subsidization of
Negro hiring by the.., government. Contractors, to gain favor
with the contracting agencies . . ., are forced to hire on racial
grounds without regard to qualifications. 180
The result of Ethridge to the taxpayer was costly in the sense that
new bids for the project were opened a couple of months later with
virtually the same contractors submitting low bids. This time, how,
ever, winning bids were 674,800 dollars higher than previously. But
this figure is insignificant when compared with the possible outcome
of a suit now pending before the same court that decided the Eth-
ridge case. In this Case the next logical step was taken by bringing
a' ,suit citing Ethridge, but seeking to enjoin construction on all
public works projects within the jurisdiction of the court - the
southern half of Ohio. The loss, if such an injunction is granted,
might run into millions of dollars. That it will have benefits as
far as putting Negroes on the job is not disputed, but the already-
existing legislative remedies could do' the same. The time saved by
the court injunction hardly seems worth the expense involved, if
the effect is to lessen reliance on administrative agencies and inter-
ject the court into an area ill-suited to judicial supervision. Per-
haps if the money the state would otherwise lose because of the
halting of its construction projects were given to the Civil Rights
Commission, the benefits derived therefrom would cause the court
to consider it an effective remedy.
E. Effect of Ethridge Decision
Armed with the threat of additional court actions tying up
more public construction projects, the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People began negotitions with Ohio
State University officials to seek the hiring of Negroes on its
projects. The result was an agreement by University officials to see
that up to 140 Negroes whether union members or not were
hired within three months. The labor director of the NAACP hailed
this as a landmark agreement which will become the basis for ne-
gotiations and court actions in other states. " 'If Negro workers don't
work on tax-supported construction, then nobody will work. If
180 Id.
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necessary, let there be a national moratorium on public works con-
struction' if Negroes are not treated equally in hiring .... ."lei
The situation is still not resolved even though the University
agreed to set up its own apprentice training program for Negroes.18 2
The NAACP claims University officials are not trying in good faith
to fulfill their agreement.1 8 The results of the pressure tactics re-
main to be seen. This alternative is just one of many available for
the elimination of discrimination in employment, and perhaps the
least satisfactory economically and politically. The result of court
suits and pressure tactics might tend to be detrimental to the over-
all struggle to eliminate discrimination in employment if the use
of energy therein weakens efforts to improve administrative reme-
dies. The goal of a commission adequately supplied with manpower
and money, prepared to process efficiently complaints of discrimina-
tion and trained to mould relief particularly suitable to each situa-
tion, should not be overshadowed. It can be attained.
David T. Milligan
181 Columbus Dispatch, Dec. 29, 1967, at SA, coL 3.
182 Columbus Dispatch, Feb. 5, 1968, at 19B, col. 5. The program would be
open to qualified Negroes turned down by unions for apprenticeship training.
Trainees will work on university construction projects while taking evening dcsses.
The estimated cost per trainee would be about $100 to $200 per year. Id.
183 Columbus Dispatch, Feb. 8, 1968, at 16 A.. col. 1.
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